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If by fnfanticide we mean directly killing, with measures known to
be lethal,. newborns or very young children classified as infants, the
Commission should be viewed as totally opposed to infanticide fqr the
following reasons:
1) "A physician's shooting or poisoning of a dying patient, even at
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The Commission, to be discussed in this essay, has been auch cited
in the medical literature and the media. Most of the con 11ents haV~
been laudatory. That concerns me, because I believe that ,;,s report 0
March, 1983 takes a less than satisfactory view of the righ , co life._~he
report I have in mind is entitled "Deciding to Forego Li:fc-Sus~In~g
Treat~ent." I sho~l~ add that the Commissi~m's full ~am.e IS
"Prestdent's CommiSsiOn for the Study of Ethtcal ProblP,ns In M 1
cine and Biomedical and Behavioral .Research." (For convenience,
refer simply to the "Commission" and all subsequent page references
refer to the one report named above.)
·
,,
· The Commission considers three values to be "dominant values.
. These are self-determination, well-being, and equity. As we shall seee,
d. al car
however equity does not actually guide the nature o f me IC .f ;,
'
s·
e ]I e~>
given to patients; it applies to equal access to health care. me
to
not singled out as a dominant value, the question arises fo~ . me as rt.
what status our right to life has for this Commission in t his repo. b
but I WIS
. l . t'
The Commission deals with a number of m ed I~a s1tu~ 1?ns
where
to focus on their discussion of care for senously tll mfants . 8.
conceptions, both of the right to life and the right to self-deter~~tY
tion, are explicitly involved under circumstances of great ambl~on
where as some like to say, everything looks. grey. To pu t our quet~ 1.de
·
'
·.
· fan IC
in its bluntest form : Does the Commission sometimes favor m
in the context of caring for seriously ill infants?

:d:.
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the patient's request and from merciful motives falls within the
definition of murder" (p. 33 ),
2)The omission .of life-saving is to be regarded in the same way, as
murder, if the result is the same (p. 34).
3) "Society seems well served by retaining the prohibition on killing" (p. 36).
·
4) The traditional prohibition of the Hippocratic Oath is to be
retained: "Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when
asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course" (p. 79) . The
reasons for following the Oath in this respect is that to do otherwise would risk : loss of patient trust; damage to a professional's
self-image; and undermining of wholehearted treatment of
gravely ill patients. (There is no mention here of violating a right
to life and we will see why momentarily.)
5)Physicians are to favor life (p. 207).
6) Early intervention for infants, seriously ill, is cost/effective (p.
The Co~mission has apparently rejected infanticide for physicians
and other health care providers. They also reject acts of omission that
result in death as . akin to murder . However, this does not end the
matter. They suggest policies which have heretofore resulted in the
~eaths of handicapped infants by omitting life-saving intervention,
lllcluding instances where the intervention would be co nsidered
routine for non-handicapped infants. By the Commission's own
reasoning, these should be reckoned as cases of infanticide and
murder. Let us carefully trace the Commission's position on this.
CoFirs~ o_f all, recall that li.fe i~ not a basic ?r " dominant·: value for the
C rnnuss10n; self-determmatwn, well-bemg and eqmty are. The
~Inrnission explicitly lists the "right to life" as among the phrases
c t ~onstitute " empty rhetoric " and that "have been used in such
~fiicting ways that their meanings, if they ever were clear, have
tha~rne hopelessly blurred" (P: 24). No affirmation here of the idea
m· _Persons are endowed with an inalienable right to life! The Comt.::lon believ~s that self-determination and well-being are the values
o::_reate obligations and are the basis of rights.
.
co tee very pertinent example illustrating this point occurs in the
ac~te xt of the Commission's commentary on the commitment of
Co care hospitals to the extension of life. This commitment is, the
m~Inission maintains, an important source of trust and an endorseof the value of persons, both medical necessities. Nevertheless,
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the Commission admonishes these hospitals by asserting th. ·patients
worthwhile and some lives are not worth sustaining. From the stand·ego life·
should not face such marked resistance to a decision to
point ofth~ value of life, its worth depends upon the worth assigned it
lf-detersustaining treatment as to . either rob them of the right t
by the patient or, in the case of infants, whether handicapped or not,
mination or damage their mental, or physical health " ( 1 08). The
by what is thought to be the worth that would or should be given it.
Commission is not limiting its remarks to patients who ar 'rminally
An individual's life is a right only insofar as it is claimed as such, or
ill!
when it cannot be claimed by that individual, life is a right insofar as it
For newborns, the Commission generally favors par ,s, where . is judged , by someone else, to have sufficient worth for that individavailable, as surrogate decision-makers. The decisions o urtogates
ual.
should be guided by two principles : respect for self-d e• n ination;
But if physicians and health professionals are to favor life, and
and the welfare or well-being of the patient in questio r ~quity or
hospitals are committed · to extending it, would not there still in fact
equality is not invoked at this point. The apparent rea~
is that it
be a functioning right to life, even for handicapped infants? There are
does not apply to decisions regarding care, only to decisin regarding
two aspects to care for handicapped infants that militate against this.
access to care as noted earlier. For infants, only the prin• le of well·
. First, the Commission recommends that parents generally be the
being applies. I remind the reader that the infants we are t , ing about 1 surrogates for their own infants whenever possible. The Commission is
are seriously ill; only some of them may be correctly ,
:m gh with
fully aware of the well-publicized data on parental choices not to treat
difficulty, judged to be terminally ill; some of them m ~ be treated
their seriously ill neWbQrns, even in instances where their lives can
with the prospect ·of a normal life-span, or in ·the ca:- of certain , clearly be sustained and their illnesses · are not terminal. These
handicaps, a life-span typical of that handicap. Where the1 in the case
instances included failure to save the lives of infants with Down's
of handicapped infants, is their ·right to live, and where is 1 eir right to
Syndrome whose lives, the Commission thinks, should be saved. The
equal treatment, that is, their -life to have the same lJ ' -sustaining
Baby Doe case in Bloomington, Indiana, is only one case in addition
treatment afforded normal infants with similar ailmen
such as a
to the many reported in medical journals. The Baby Doe case is
bowel obstruction? Perhaps these are implicitly recog1:. ?.ed by the
especially notable because it was a state supreme court that sanctioned
Commission though not mentioned. Perhaps they are noi regarded as
·a Parental decision not to feed and not to operate on their infant
rights. The answers to these questions require a further p ro be into the
child. By the Commission's owu' standards, not feeding an infant
exact advice the Commission gives to surrogate decision-m i-tkers.
would qualify as murder, as a failure to act that leads to death.
The Commission depicts the relation between parents and physicians,
with regard to . treating seriously ill newborns, in the chart
Commission Says Surrogate Should Decide
below.
·
. ·
decide
The· surrogate sho\lld, in the judgment
of the Com m1sswn,
whether the continued existence of the seriously ill infant would ~r ·
would not be "a net benefit to the infant. " This, for the sake of ~h: I
self-determination that the infant lacks, should be done fro~ is
infant's perspective. In the Commi~sion's _words, "The ~o~:nissl~~S).
concerned with the value of the patient's hfe for the patient (p.
f
It is this value to which the Commission refers when it speaks~- ,
judging what is for the patient's well-being or best interests. The Co emission however is concerned at the same time that enor~ous r d I
sources' may be ~pent, for little beriefit, to sustain "a painful ~y
burdened life for an individual who has little or no c~pacity to e~~at
it." How much is a little in benefit, or a little in capacity? Aware n's
many do not think it beneficial to sustain the infants with J?ow of )
Syndrome, the Commission categorically suggests t~at the h~~ bf
persons with this degree and range of mental . handicaps sho
I
saved, when possible, because their lives are generally meaningful. ualll'
From the standpoint of equality then, lives are n o t seen as eq
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-Physician's Assessment

Parents Prefer to
Accept Treatment

Parents Prefer to
Forego Treatment

Provide treatment

Provide treatment
during review process

Ambiguous or uncertain

Provide treatment

Forego treatment

Futile

Prov:ide treatm~nt
unless provider
declines to do so

Forego treatment

of Treatment Options
. Clearly beneficial
t-1-

..._

(Table 1, p. 218)
From this chart we can see that the physician only strives with the

Parents when parents refuse clearly beneficial treatment, or in the case
of futile treatment, when parents want treatment that the provider is
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unwilling to offer. If life were a dominant value, one would
pect
that ambiguous or uncertain cases would be decided on the le of
maintaining life. Such is not t he recommendation of t he Co m :·1 ;ion,
and this certainly qualifies what they say about physicians f · Jring
life .
Not just parental attitudes but also those of physicians af • t the
care seriously ill infants will receive, and physicians influence u-ents
by their assessments of how beneficial treatment will be. They nd to
see t reatment for mentally handicapped infants as futile. The ( n mis·
sion is willing to see infants with Down's Syndrome treated ; t. .;e are
infants who are usually moderately retarded. But many p r icians
take issue with this and the decisions of parents will be based ' their
assessments. Physicians oft en use the term "hopeless," for exa . .Jle, to
describe both a condition of terminal illness, and one of a pe 1anent
mental handicap. As many as sixty-one percent of the physic ns sur·
veyed in California in 197 5 would, with parental cqnsent, fa1 co pro·
vide life-saving treatment for a Down's Syndrome infant. In a 1tion~
survey, eighty-five percent of the ~ediatrie surgeons, in
7, ~1~
they would acquiesce in parental w1shes not . to treat an m.L 1t w1t
Down's who also had congenital heart disease; sixty-five perceh of the
· pediatricians would do likewise. Another study found that t ~fty-one
percent of the pediatricians surveyed in Mas~achusett~ w ~mld ?~
recommend surgery for a ·nown's Syndrome mfant w1th 1:1 testm
blockage. The Commission cites these three studies (p. 208 }. Hence,
the Commission is aware that what by their own formulat io ns could
be deemed murder or infanticide, will take place, unless som e p~o~ec·
tion not now in place, is provided and enforced. The Co m mlSS10?
explicitly rejects legal and governmental interference in t hese ?eel·
sions: Self-determination both of health professionals and of pat1ents
or their surrogates is a right not to be interfered with.
One might well ask how the value of life can be subordinat e to the
value of self-determination. The value of life is to be judged by the
indlvidual, and when it is judged by another person, it is do ne_ on t~
basis of the well-being of that life, particularly whether that hf~ ~
still allow the individual to be at least somewhat self- determ m~g.
Self-determination, for the Commission, consists in "a person form_m~:
revising, over time, and pursui~g his or her own particular plan of hfe

_1;

(p. 43).
.
.
ft f its
During the time the Commission was preparmg the fmal dra 0 t
report, I had the opportunity to read and comment on a dr~~ thai
closely resembled the final one - the one I have been descn bmg.
noticed and commented in a letter that "life" was not treated as_a
dominant value. In reply, Dr. Joanne Lynn wrote a cordial l~tter ~
which she said, on. this point, that "the report does not list hfeu~of
'dominant value' because, for the purposes of this ,report, .the val selflife is included in the other categories, especially well-bemg and
0

determination" (Nov. 1, 1982). The Commission also saw fit not to
change their minds, or their report, in this respect.
Now, regardless of how the reader may think or feel about the
Commission's conception of rights, it should be evident that 'it is not
making a separate right out of the right to life. Self-determination is
what others are obligated to secure and protect. There is no unqualified right to life : Its value is to be determined by each individual ; and
·for individuals deemed incapable of judging the value of their own
lives, what value life has is based on someone else 's assessment of their
best interests or well-being. Of course, we are talking about the value
of an individual's life in the. context of health care decisions. This is a
sphere of individual liberty for the Commission. The Commission is not
willing simply to assert or accept what the American Declaration of
Independence designates as an inalienable right to life. Unlike that ·
Declaration, the Commission views every judgment of the value of
individuaUife as either a self-assessment of its utility, or as an assessment of itS utility by someone else. While the value of life may not
always have a high degree of utility, self-determination for the Commission always does. Indeed, any loss in one's capacity to be selfdetermining is deemed a loss in the utility of one's life to oneself and
to others. For the Commission, then, there is no strictly equal right to
life and no stable, high value to be placed on life. Entitlement to
equality of one's basic right to life is, therefore, always _qualified by
the differences in utility, whether judged by oneself or by someone
else. And the degree of that utility is largely, sometimes exclusively, a
function of the degree to which someone is self-determining. The
~ffect of this kind of thinking is that it sanctions discrimination and
1nfanticide relative to handicapped infants, in principle and in practice.
.
.
It is no wonder then, that Congressional action was necessary and
that it came on October 9, 1984 (H.R. 1904) in the form of amendments to the Child Abuse Act. Congress moved against any discriminatory treatment of seriously ill handicapped infants: Infants with dis. abilities are to receive the same care expected for infants generally.
That specifically includes appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medi. cation. But health professionals, and all of us together in the larger
COmmunity, will need to be alert if this law is to be effective. As we
have seen from the Commission's report, there are many physicians
~ho will be reluctant to give optimistic prognoses when infants have
~-bilities, in fact or in prospect, and parents and others may have
difflculty discerning what the real prospects are. And, I need not add,
Pl'og:noses for infants are often so uncertain. So, despite the help from
~nt law, the struggle will continue for straight thinking about what
JUstlce (equality of basic rights) demands, and for the willingness to
meet those demands. It is a struggle for the very lives of infants
everywhere.
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